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ABSTRACT 
The USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is commonly referred to as “the nation’s 
911 force.”  It must be capable of executing a full spectrum of missions from low-
intensity humanitarian assistance and noncombat evacuations to high-intensity major 
combat operations.  The structure and equipment are designed around this multimission 
requirement.  However, the USMC owns the fixed-winged Shadow unmanned aircraft 
system (UAS) and is in the process of acquiring a small fixed-wing UAS, the small 
tactical UAS (STUAS) to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.  The 
USMC is also researching a cargo resupply UAS based on helicopter technology.  The 
USMC focus on single mission UAS does not fit with the MEU’s mission requirements.  
This thesis will examine MEU mission requirements and recommend a UAS capability 
set that best supports MEU operations.  From this recommended set of requirements, the 
thesis will use a cost analysis to determine a future UAS program of record.   
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It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor 
more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a 
new order of things. 
   —Niccolo Machiavelli (Machiavelli, 1952, p. 55) 
A. PURPOSE 
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is 
commonly referred to as “the nation’s 911 force.”  It must be capable of executing a full 
spectrum of missions, from low-intensity humanitarian assistance and noncombat 
evacuations to high-intensity major combat operations.  Its structure and equipment are 
designed around this diverse mission requirement.  One of the four organizations in a 
MEU, the aviation combat element (ACE), meets this requirement by maintaining a blend 
of aircraft platforms that operate throughout this diverse spectrum.  Each platform is 
specifically designed to execute multiple missions to minimize the need for several 
different assets on the constrained space of the Navy ships that support an MEU. 
Currently, the USMC does not have unmanned systems that support the MEU.  
The USMC operates a variety of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), including a small 
fixed-wing UAS, the small tactical UAS (STUAS), and a larger fixed-wing UAS called 
the Shadow RQ-7.  The USMC is also researching a cargo resupply UAS based on 
helicopter technology.  The Marine’s focus on single-mission UASs does not fit with 
USMC mission requirements and will prevent full employment of future systems due to 
limited space on Navy ships.   
Although the USMC has several UAS programs, it needs to develop a 
multimission system and establish this UAS as the program of record.   
B. OBJECTIVES 
In this project, I identify a future multimission UAS to support the warfighter. 
The success of future MEUs and, in turn, the success of the USMC relies on current and 
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relevant equipment.  This equipment must fit the operational needs of the MEU without 
exceeding the constraints of the shipboard environment.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
The ideal location to establish the requirements for a UAS program of record is 
arguably in the Marine Corps’ most arduous environments: aboard ship with an MEU.  
The MEU is the backbone of USMC doctrine and is based on the concept of the Marine 
Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).  An analysis of the MEU’s missions provides the 
most accurate picture of what a future UAS should look like.  I will use a multi-step 
methodology to locate a multimission platform that can achieve the full spectrum of 
MEU mission requirements.  
My methodology for this thesis includes three steps: (1) determine required UAS 
capabilities, (2) construct a basic UAS design, and (3) determine the cost of the design. 
In the first step, define UAS capabilities, I survey Marine officers who are 
familiar with MEU and UAS operations.  The survey responses reveal capability 
requirements that could be transferred from manned aircraft to a future unmanned 
system. 
During the capabilities definition step, I also interview current and past MEU 
commanders to identify capability shortfalls they perceive or scenarios in which they 
anticipate using an unmanned platform instead of a manned aircraft. 
In the second step of this research, I analyze the recommended capabilities and 
then design a platform that supports these capabilities.  Some possible options for this 
design include rotary-wing or fixed-wing platforms that vary in size from small to very 
large.  Using the capabilities identified in step one, I determine the systems that need to 
be attached to the new UAS. 
Based on the basic design concept, I conduct a parametric analysis to determine 
an average unit cost for the new UAS.  Numerous existing cost-estimating relationships 
provide the necessary cost data.  The cost data from these relationships provide a credible 
cost estimate for acquisition program decision makers. 
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D. SUMMARY 
As the USMC postures itself for the future, it must ensure that decisions made 
concerning unmanned systems support mission success.  The future of manned USMC 
aviation is set by choices with the MV-22, CH-53K, and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).  
All manned platforms are capable of executing multiple missions in support of MEU 
operations, and the unmanned systems should be similarly capable. 
As the United States (U.S.) begins to de-mobilize from a decade of conflict 
abroad, the country will rely on the MEU to be the face of U.S. and USMC presence 
overseas.  The Marines will be asked to support this central role in foreign policy while 
defense budgets shrink.  The USMC will be asked to do more with less, again 
highlighting the need for one multimission-capable program of record for UAS. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There has been speculation that war itself may not have a future and is 
about to be replaced by economic competition among the great “trading 
blocks” now forming in Europe, North America, and the Far East.  This 
. . . view is not correct. Large-scale, conventional war—war as understood 
by today’s principal military powers—may indeed be at its last gasp; 
however, war itself, war as such, is alive and kicking and about to enter a 
new epoch.   
—Martin van Creveld (1991, p. 2) 
A. STRATEGIC POLICY AND VISION 
The Department of Defense (DoD) regularly publishes a roadmap establishing its 
vision for unmanned systems.  In its most current roadmap document, the DoD made this 
statement: 
The vision for the DoD is that unmanned systems will provide flexible 
options across operating domains, enabling the Warfighter’s execution of 
assigned missions.  Unmanned systems will be integrated across domains 
and with manned systems, providing the Joint Force Commander (JFC) 
with unique and decisive capabilities. (DoD, 2009, p. 7) 
This joint vision fully supports the Navy and USMC’s overarching tenets of 
operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS) and ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM).  
For successful execution of OMFTS or STOM, an unmanned system will need systems 
that are flexible enough to operate across all domains.   
The USMC’s vision also mandates aggressive exploration into the application of 
unmanned systems (Commandant of the Marine Corps [CMC], 2008, p. 19).  More 
specifically, the USMC is examining ways to use UAS to extend “the range and 
effectiveness of naval surface fire support” (Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command [MCCDC], 2009, p. 29) or to improve ACE performance by relying on 
unmanned systems to reduce the footprint of the MAGTF in expeditionary operations 
(Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, 2010).   
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B. MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT 
The MEU has a long history that goes back to 1776, when embarked Marines 
landed on the beaches of New Providence, The Bahamas (Simmons & Moskin, 1998, p. 
7).  Since that first landing, Marines have been embarking on Navy ships and deploying 
around the world to provide the U.S. with a force projection instrument for global peace. 
An MEU is designed around the concept of a MAGTF; a multi-faceted task force 
has all the elements necessary to be self-sufficient in combat.  There are four elements to 
all MEUs: a ground combat element (GCE), a logistics combat element (LCE), command 
element (CE), and an aviation combat element (ACE). 
1. Ground Combat Element 
The heart of the MEU is the GCE.  The GCE for an MEU consists of an infantry 
battalion that is reinforced with artillery, reconnaissance, engineers, armor, and assault 
amphibian units (USMC, 1998, p. 3). 
2. Logistics Combat Element 
This element is the task-organized logistical and sustainment unit for the MEU.  
The LCE can provide support either from Navy ships at sea or from expeditionary 
locations ashore (USMC, 1998, p. 3). 
3. Command Element 
The command element contains the necessary capabilities to command and 
control the MEU.  The CE is also task organized and can consist of intelligence, 
communication, and administration units (USMC, 1998, p. 3). 
4. Aviation Combat Element 
The ACE is a task-organized and reinforced Marine squadron that normally 
consists of both rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft.  A common MEU ACE squadron 




landing (V/STOL) fixed-wing attack aircraft” as part of its table of equipment (TE; 
USMC, 1998, p. 3).  Table 1 lists all of the characteristics and armament of the traditional 
aircraft found on the ACE’s TE. 
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6300 lbs 170 370 14000 
20mm gun / AGM-114 
HELLFIRE / TOW / 
AIM-9 Sidewinder / 
AGM-122 Sidearm / 
2.75in rockets 
UH-1N 
(IHS , 2011c) 3290 lbs 110 276 12,600 
.50 cal / 7.62mm / 2.75 in 
rockets 
UH-1Y 














25mm cannon / AIM-9 
Sidewinder / AGM-65 
Maverick / GBU-38 
JDAM (500lb family of 
bombs) 
F-35B 
(IHS , 2011e) 28500 lbs 1043 450 60,000 
25mm cannon / JDAM 
family of bombs / AIM-9 
Sidewinder / GBU-12 
Paveway II / AGM-154 
JSOW 
Table 1.   MEU ACE Aircraft Performance Characteristics 
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The ACE’s mission is to be prepared to execute some or all of the six functions of 
Marine aviation: assault support, control of aircraft and missiles, offensive air support, 
anti-air warfare, electronic warfare, and air reconnaissance (USMC, 1998, p. 3). 
C. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS  
Research, development, and procurement of UASs have been volatile in the DoD 
for the past decade.  This is demonstrated by the large amounts of money spent on UAS 
programs.  In the span of 2009–2013 (budgeted and planned), the DoD has budgeted over 
$5 billion on UAS research and development and close to $9 billion on procurement.   
The Department of the Navy (DON), including the USMC, also is dedicated to 
the procurement of UAS.  In 2011, the DON established the Consortium for Robotics and 
Unmanned Systems Education and Research (CRUSER) at the Naval Postgraduate 
School for the sole purpose of furthering the Navy’s UAS efforts (Under Secretary of the 
Navy [USN], 2011).   
As part of the formation of CRUSER, the Under Secretary of the Navy (2011) 
established goals for the development of DON/Joint UAS capabilities.  These goals 
include the following:   
 Develop common system components across the Medium Range UAS 
(MRUAS) and Cargo UAS (CUAS) to achieve maximum capability for 
service/joint mission requirements, with a goal of achieving a common 
“truck” for both missions.  
 Develop a Group 4 Vertical Lift Seabased Cargo UAS-CUAS initial 
operating capability (IOC) 2016  
 Develop a Group 4 Expeditionary Electronic Warfare (EW)/ Intelligence 
Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) /Strike – Marine Expeditionary Force 
(MEF)/ Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) UAS IOC 2018  
1. Vehicles 
Unmanned systems are defined by the air, surface, or subsurface vehicles that 
move the complex systems and payloads required for the mission.  The primary 
unmanned aircraft vehicles have been fixed-wing aircraft.  Table 2 provides examples of 
four UASs: two fixed-wing aircraft and two vertical-takeoff aircraft.   
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5600 >1000 140 30000 20+ 300–1000 EO/IR    
Notes. I created this table based on information found in FY2009–2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated 
Roadmap (DoD, 2009, pp. 51–75). 
Both the MQ-8 Firescout and A-160 Hummingbird are still under research and development and in 
different phases of the acquisition process. 
Table 2.   Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Because of the effectiveness of improvised explosive devices (IED), the USMC 
has recently shown interest in vertical-takeoff or rotary-wing vehicles to carry cargo in 
Afghanistan.  However, unlike the development of fixed-wing UASs, the research and 
development of rotary-wing UASs has focused on the utilization of production 
helicopters. 
2. Systems 
The predominant use of unmanned systems is to support intelligence gathering 
and to make use of imaging technology.  Imaging systems consist primarily of electro-
optic (EO)—also known as visible spectrum—cameras and infrared (IR) cameras. 
As unmanned platforms become more capable, the DoD explores new UASs with 
increased mission capabilities.  Expanded UAS capabilities include targeting, 
weaponization, and improved reconnaissance with the synthetic aperture radar (SAR; 
DoD, 2009, p. xiii). 
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3. Future 
The future of unmanned systems is defined by a list of challenges and risks.  
Some of the challenges are identifying requirements, preventing duplication, and creating 
new career paths for service members.  The risks revolve around the fast-paced 
advancement of technology in the UAS community. 
The future developers of UAS will have to tackle numerous challenges, but the 
ever-changing and unclear requirements are most serious.  As technology advances and 
increased capabilities become available for unmanned systems, the requirements change.  
These changes lead to requirement creep, which complicates the acquisition process 
because UASs become more costly (DoD, 2009). 
Another issue for the future is duplication.  Again, as technology develops and 
stakeholders push for a fast supply of UASs, organizations and services could duplicate 
UAS capabilities, resulting in a rise in unit costs and consequent problems in the 
acquisition process (DoD, 2009). 
The last major concern for UAS progress is the career path of the service 
members who work with UAS.  Currently, no UAS-specific job specialties exist in any 
service.  Primary controllers spend one tour working on UAS and then return to their 
previous occupational specialty.  For UAS workers to create a professional organization 
with an experience base for future development, a career path must be established (DoD, 
2009). 
The final topic of discussion is the future risks associated with UAS.  This 
technology is advancing in leaps and bounds.  This fast-paced advancement, combined 
with the lethargic acquisition process, has the inherent risk of causing the DoD to acquire 
unmanned systems that are obsolete by the time they are fielded (DoD, 2009). 
D. COST ESTIMATION  
In the acquisition community, cost estimation is the method used to determine 
costs of programs.  There are four main methods to determine costs: (1) expert, (2) 
analogy, (3) parametric, and (4) engineering breakdown.  The primary method for my 
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research is the parametric method.  The parametric method examines several systems that 
are similar in nature to the program that is under review.  The different costs of these 
similar systems are used to determine a cost-estimating relationship that can be applied to 
any new system to estimate the costs of these new systems. 
1. Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) 
One technique used to determine cost estimates is breaking a system into its 
different elements. The costs of the elements can then be used to determine the total system 
costs. A WBS (an example of which is shown in Figure 1) “reflects the requirements, what 
must be accomplished to develop a program, and provides a basis for identifying resources 
and tasks for developing a program cost estimate” (GAO, 2009).  WBS models and their 
associated cost elements are considered one of the best practices for estimating the costs of 
programs and managing them over their life cycle (GAO, 2009). 
 
Figure 1.   UAS Work Breakdown Structure (From Horak, Harbour, & Holcomb, 2007, p. 3) 
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2. Uncertainty  
The Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA, 2009, § 2334) 
states that those who estimate costs must: 
Disclose in accordance with paragraph (2) the confidence level used in 
establishing a cost estimate for a major defense acquisition program or 
major automated information system program, the rationale for selecting 
such confidence level, and, if such confidence level is less than 80%, the 
justification for selecting a confidence level of less than 80%. 
The mandate to select a confidence level suggests that there is a degree of 
uncertainty in cost estimation.  The simple definition of cost estimation as a prediction of 
a future value of cost in itself should be enough to highlight the occurrence of 
uncertainty. 
The methods used to derive costs bring uncertainty into cost estimation.  For 
example, in this research I use the parametric method to determine the cost of UAS.  
When one uses the parametric method, one tries to compare costs of previous systems to 
estimate the cost of a new program.  The variables and values used to define the cost of 
old systems will not be the same as the variables and values of the new system.  Two 
factors drive uncertainty in this scenario.  The first factor is physical differences between 
old and new systems that affect the values of the variables that will be used for the cost 
estimations.  The second factor driving uncertainty, which for cost estimators is the 
biggest driving factor, is that when the cost estimation is complete, the resulting values 
for the variables have rarely been determined. 
The occurrence of uncertainty led the Cost Analysis Improvement Group to create 
certain requirements:   
Areas of cost estimating uncertainty will be identified and quantified.  
Uncertainty will be quantified by the use of probability distributions or 
ranges of cost.  The presentation of this analysis should address cost 
uncertainty attributable to estimating errors; e.g., uncertainty inherent with 
estimating costs based on assumed values of independent variables outside 
data base ranges, and uncertainty attributed to other factors, such as 
performance and weight characteristics, new technology, manufacturing 
initiatives, inventory objectives, schedules, and financial condition of the  
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contractor. The probability distributions, and assumptions used in 
preparing all range estimates, shall be documented. (Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, 1992, p. 33) 
a. Monte Carlo Method/Probability 
The Monte Carlo (MC) method is a common approach used to determine 
the probability distribution, or range of costs.  MC provides the full “range of possible 
outcomes and the probabilities they will occur for any choice of action” (Palisade, 2011).  
The MC method can determine the full range of outcomes by randomly selecting values 
for the variables found in the cost-estimating relationships (CER) chosen to define the 
costs of each level of the WBS.   
For each variable, there is a range of expected values.  The probability 
distribution functions (PDF) of the variables are the tools that MC uses to derive the final 
CER distributions.  Palisades (2011), a maker of risk software, defines the common 
variables’ probabilities distributions that I used in this research: 
 Normal (or “bell curve”).  User-defined mean or expected value 
and a standard deviation describe the variation about the mean. 
(Palisade, 2011) 
 Uniform.  All values have an equal chance of occurring, and the 
user selects a minimum and maximum. (2011) 
 Triangle.  User-defined minimum, most likely, and maximum 
values. (2011) 
 Custom.  User-defined specific values that occur and the likelihood 
or probability of each. (2011) 
Once the variables have been defined according to the probabilities, values 
are selected randomly from the input variables distributions and the CER is calculated to 
determine a single iteration solution.  The MC method then repeats the process thousands 
of times.  Each iteration selects different random values for the variables.  The results of 
the thousands of iterations define the distribution or range of outcomes and the 
corresponding probabilities for those outcomes (Palisade, 2011). 
There are several benefits to the MC method.  One is the ability to graph 
the outcomes of the iterations.  The graphic output allows the user to easily determine the 
most likely or more probable solution or cost.  A second benefit is sensitivity analysis.  
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MC permits a user to examine how sensitive the cost estimate is to changes in the 
variables used to determine the estimate (Palisade, 2011). 
E. CONCLUSION 
As the USMC continues to develop its UAS programs, it must emphasize MEU 
operations.  When the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan end, the USMC will return to its 
mandated mission as the nation’s 911 force; ready to execute according to the will of the 
President of the United States.   
Numerous studies have identified technology gaps that limit the USMC’s ability 
to achieve mission success.  New and improved multimission aircraft are overloading 
Navy ships, and current UAS designs do not support MEU operations.  As the USMC 
continues to explore future UAS, the service must research, develop, and procure a 
multimission unmanned aircraft that relieves overloading, but that also fills the gaps in 
the manned and unmanned platforms currently deployed with the MEU.  A multimission 
UAS will ensure the future success of the MEU and, thus, the USMC.  
 15
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, SCOPE, AND LIMITATIONS 
Word came on May 27 that another revolution was in full swing at 
Bluefields, on the east coast of Nicaragua. We received orders to leave at 
eight thirty in the morning and by eleven thirty were on our way—two 
hundred and fifty officers and men. Mrs. Butler had [gone]. . . to do some 
shopping.  When she returned at noon, I was gone. 
—Smedley D. Butler (Thomas, 1933, p. 27) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The MEU’s operations and environments are unique.  Three MEUs are always 
deployed throughout the world, working in different climates and places.  This 
uniqueness makes deciding what type of UAS best supports MEU operations a difficult 
task.  To best accomplish this task, I pulled input from as many Marines as possible to 
determine the capability requirements that (1) are most conducive to being employed by 
unmanned systems and (2) best support MEU operations.  The first step of my research is 
to define the capability requirements of a new system, and the next step is to analyze the 
cost of any new systems that have those capabilities. 
B. IDENTIFICATION OF UAS CONFIGURATION FOR USMC PROGRAM 
OF RECORD 
1. Survey  
The survey of Marines (Appendix A) is the primary instrument I will use to 
identify the UAS capabilities that would best support the future needs of MEU 
operations.  The survey is divided in two parts.  Part one contains individual experience 
questions to assist me in categorizing participants’ recommendations based on military 
occupational specialty (MOS), UAS experience, and amount of MEU experience.  Part 




To maintain participants’ anonymity, I used Survey Monkey, an online 
survey.  I uploaded all the questions into the online survey and a link created to the 
survey that I e-mailed to the participants.  The link was the method of participating in the 
survey.  SurveyMonkey’s protocols have limited ability to prevent users from taking the 
survey more than once; therefore, the data could be skewed if participants took the survey 
several times. 
b. Selection of Survey Participants 
The participants were drawn from across the active duty operating forces 
of the USMC.  I contacted each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) for permission to 
release the survey to units that commonly work with or operate UAS.  The units of 
interest included the following: 
 Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadrons (VMUs), 
 Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), 
 Reconnaissance (Recon), 
 Special Operations Training Group (SOTG), 
 MEU Command Element, and 
 MEU Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs). 
With MEF approval, I identified and contacted the executive officers (XO) 
of each unit to distribute the survey.  Officers were the primary audience in each 
organization.  The SurveyMonkey link was embedded in the e-mail so the XO’s could 
easily forward the e-mail throughout the officer e-mail distribution lists for their units. 
These units were the focus of the survey; however, no controls were 
placed on the survey to prevent participation from other personnel, such as command-
level personnel at the different MEFs or individuals at organizations such as the Marine 
Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC).  I also released the survey to all 
Marine students of the Naval Postgraduate School. 
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c. Survey Size 
I planned for a maximum of 500 survey responses.  A minimum response 
level of 10% was established to ensure a large enough sample size to reflect the views of 
the USMC. 
2. Interviews  
The final part of the capability requirement definition consisted of interviewing 
current and past MEU commanders.  I considered the MEU commanders as an expert 
group for this research.  They could best answer the questions on how any future UAS 
would be employed by the MEU and how current systems are being employed.  This 
insight should provide excellent direction on any future program of record that will 
support these commanders today and in the foreseeable future. 
I designed the interview questions (Appendix B) with this idea in mind.  There are 
seven MEU’s in the Marine Corps—three each for I MEF in California and II MEF in 
North Carolina and one for III MEF in Okinawa.  I planned for 10 interviews, which 
included the seven current MEU commanders and the three commanders who most 
recently completed their tours as a MEU CO.  The acceptable minimum to ensure a 
spread of knowledge and experience was 50%. 
C. COST-ESTIMATING RELATIONSHIPS 
Following the determination of future UAS capabilities, the next logical step was 
to develop a cost estimate for this capability or set of capabilities.  To develop this 
estimate, I established a simple work breakdown structure (WBS) that divided the system 
into its smallest parts.  From the simple WBS, I identified the most important variables, 
and then established CERs or used current estimating tools.  Using a Monte Carlo 
simulation, I then estimated the costs of future systems with some level of certainty 
(within determined probabilities). 
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1. Work Breakdown Structure 
For simplicity, a basic WBS was used to derive costs.  For the UAS, the most 
basic WBS consisted of the air vehicle, the payload/sensor, and the ground control 
equipment.  These three pieces are required in order to acquire and employ any UAS 
system.  Assuming that other systems, such as those associated with Systems 
Engineering, would have similar common WBS item costs, I chose to ignore the other 
common WBS items. 
2. Variables and Relationships 
Using cost-estimating relationships from the Office of the Deputy Assistant of the 
Army for Cost and Economics (DASA-CE), I developed average cost estimates for each 
work breakdown level.  I normalized all cost estimates to fiscal year (FY) 2003 dollars 
for comparison. 
a. Air Vehicle 
(1) Variables.  I estimated the cost of the first production unit or T1 
cost for the platform only.  The platform includes all the flying hardware and systems that 
are required for the operation of the air vehicle.  Table 3 lists the variables used to 











Variable Definition Range 
Empty Wt Empty weight of air vehicle  4–4,589 lbs 
MGTOW Maximum gross takeoff weight 6–25,600 lbs 
Prod 
The air vehicle is a production aircraft
(1) or development aircraft (0). 0 or 1 
Endurance Length of time air vehicle can fly 1–38 hrs 
Payload Wt 
Maximum weight of payload air 
vehicle can carry 1–1,960 lbs 
FF Year First year the air vehicle flew 1973–2000 





The air vehicle is a vertical- takeoff 
vehicle/helicopter (1) or a fixed-wing 
vehicle (0) 0 or 1 
Table 3.   Air Vehicle Variable Definitions and Ranges  
(2) Relationships.  I averaged three equations  to determine the unit 
cost of the air vehicle.  Equations one and two directly derived the vehicle’s T1 costs and 
the equations three and four estimated the generic unit cost.  Equations 1 and 2 were 
published by Cherwonik and Wehrley (2003; Equation 1 from p. 20 and Equation 2 from 
p. 16) and Equations 3 and 4 were distributed by Horak et al. (2007; Equation 3 from p. 
12 and Equation 4 from p. 10): 
T1 = 12.55 * (MGTOW)0.749 * e(-0.371 * Prod)  (1) 
 
T1 = 118.75 * (Endurance * Payload Wt)0.587 * e-0.010 * (FF Year-1900) * e(-0.921 * Prod) (2) 
    
Unit Cost = 0.952 * (1.097  * (Range)0.307 * (Payload Wt)0.399 * (Altitude)0.370 * e(-0.372 * 
Prod) * e(0.944 * VTOL) * Sys Qty0.848) / Sys Qty  (3) 
 
Unit Cost = 0.952 * (0.432 * (Empty Wt)0.597 * (Altitude)0.442 * e(-0.372 * Prod) * e(0.636 * VTOL) 






b. Payload and Sensor 
(1) Variables.  I made the sensor and payload estimates using the 
2003 DASA-CE report (Cherwonik & Wehrley, 2003).  I used two cost relationships to 
derive and average sensor cost.  These costs are associated with the modular systems that 
perform the work (e.g., forward-looking infrared, electro-optics, laser designators, 
targeting pods). The variables used to estimate the payload and sensor costs are found in 
Table 4.  
 
Variable Definition Range 
Sensor Wt Weight of sensor 40–625 lbs 
Tracking 
Does the sensor track targets (1) or 
not (0) 0 or 1 




The maximum altitude the air vehicle 
will operate 15–65,000 ft 
FU Year 
First year the sensor was used on an 
air vehicle 1991–2002 
Table 4.   Payload and Sensor Variable Definitions and Ranges 
(2) Relationships.  I used the following equations (Cherwonik & 
Wehrley, 2003, pp. 23–30) to derive and average sensor cost for the unmanned system 
using the variables in Table 4: 
 
 Sensor 1  = 24,490 * (Avg Res)-0.498 * (Altitude)0.726 * e(1.755 * Tracking) * e-.137 * (FU +Year – 1900)  
  (5) 
 
 Sensor 2 = 0.347 * (Sensor Wt.)1.575 * e(0.473 * Tracking) (6) 
 
 Sensor 3 = 290.18 * 106 * (Avg Res)-0.830 * e(1.829 * Tracking) * e-.169 * (FU Year – 1900)  (7) 
c. Ground Support and Equipment (GS&E) 
(1) Variables.  The final level of the WBS is the GS&E, which 
consists of all the ground control equipment (e.g., the joysticks).  The variables used to 
estimate the GS&E costs are found in Table 5. 
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Variable Definition Range 
Range 






The GS&E is mobile/tactical (1) or 
not (0) 0 or 1 
Man Packable 
The GS&E is man packable (1) or 
not (0) 0 or 1 
Sys Qty 
The number of air vehicles per 
control system 1–8 
Table 5.   GS&E Variable Definitions and Ranges 
(2) Relationships.  For GS&E, I used two DASA-CE cost 
relationships to determine the average cost per unit of the GS&E.  I used the two 
following Cherwonik and Wehrley equations (2003; Equation 8 from p. 37 and Equation 
9 from p. 42):  
 
 GS&E1 = 433.4 * (Range)0.507 * e(0.398 * Mobile Base/Tactical) * e(-3.480 * Man Packable) (8) 
 
 GS&E2 = 435.3 * (MGTOW * Syst Qty)0.318 * e(-3.83 * Man Packable) (9) 
3. Monte Carlo and Crystal Ball 
I derived the cost probabilities for different variable combinations by running the 
WBS costing equations described above through a Monte Carlo simulation.  I used 
Crystal Ball software to execute the Monte Carlo simulation. 
In order to create the best fit curves in Crystal Ball, I set the program to simulate 
10,000 trials for each run of the simulation.  I used variable combinations that best fit the 
results of the surveys and interviews. I used the results of the Crystal Ball analysis to 
created tornado diagrams for the Monte Carlo simulation to provide sensitivity analysis 
for each variable. 
D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have established a method to determine a future UAS program of 
record.  Using the desired missions given to me by Marines and MEU commanders, I can 
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establish the capabilities for this future program.  My cost analysis will help to determine 
the cost effective capabilities this UAS can execute.  In the next chapter, I will describe 




IV. PRESENTATION OF ANALYSIS, DATA, AND INSIGHT 
Plans must be simple and flexible. Actually they only form a datum plane 
from which you build as necessity directs or opportunity offers. They 
should be made by the people who are going to execute them. 
—George S. Patton (1947, p. 399) 
A. UAS CAPABILITY ANALYSIS 
1. Survey Results 
The call for participation yielded in 136 respondents that had varying 
occupational specialties, MEU, and UAS experience. 
a. Respondent Statistics 
There were three specific categories that I examined with respect to the 
respondents of the survey.  The first was the individual military occupational specialties 
(MOS), the second was MEU experience, and the third category was UAS experience. 
(1)  MOS Breakdown.  In Figure 2, I break out the MOS categories 
and the percentages of each that participated in the survey.  The MOS categories were 
divided along commonly accepted lines.  Two categories were a combination across 
several skills sets.  The first category, combat arms, consisted of any of the 03XX 
(infantry), 08XX (artillery), 13XX (combat engineer), and 18XX (armor) MOSs.  The 
other compilation was the “other” category, and it consisted of 01XX (administration), 
11XX (utilities), 30XX (supply), 34XX (financial management), 43XX (public affairs), 




Figure 2.   Military Occupational Specialty Breakdown 
(2)  MEU Experience.  Of the 136 respondents, 77 had some level 
of MEU experience.  In Figure 3, I lay out the breakdown of the differing experience 
levels throughout the sample.  The experience level is representative of the current 
USMC MEU experience, especially with the last decade of ground combat in Operations 
Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.  Based upon the representativeness of this data, 
and the focus of the research, I used the MEU experience as the major comparison data 
when making UAS capability decisions. 
 
Figure 3.   MEU Experience 
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(3)  UAS Experience.  When examining the UAS data, 52 of the 
respondents had not worked with unmanned systems in any respect.  In Figure 4,  
I display the UAS experience breakdown.  While creating Figure 5, I further noticed that 
of those with MEU experience, only one-third did not have UAS experience. 
 
Figure 4.   UAS Experience (All Respondents) 
 
Figure 5.   UAS Experience (with MEU Experience) 
b. Mission Analysis 
The respondents were asked their opinions on which missions they felt 
were a UAS’ primary, secondary, tertiary, quaternary, and least desirable missions.  
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Analysis of all five responses revealed that in all cases the percentage breakdowns were 
proportionally the same between all the respondents and those with MEU experience.  
For simplicity’s sake, only the charts representing the data for respondents with MEU 
experience are included in this chapter.  Appendix C contains the charts displaying the 
survey mission results from all respondents. 
For the primary mission, the overwhelming response was ISR at 74% of 
the respondents, as I show in Figure 6.  The mission that the closest number of 
respondents felt worthy of the primary mission was strike at 12%. 
 
Figure 6.   Primary Mission (with MEU Experience) 
The secondary mission results, which I show in Figure 7, displayed a 
wider variance of opinions.  The top three survey responses were all within 3% of each 
other.  Respondents chose communication relay most often at 25%, with strike (24%) and 
FAC(A; 22%) as the other two most commonly chosen secondary missions. 
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Figure 7.   Secondary Mission (with MEU Experience) 
In Appendix C, I show that when I considered all respondents’ surveys, 
strike received the highest response for the UAS secondary mission.  Figure 7, with 
communication relay as the secondary mission, is reflective of the needs of the MEU.  A 
survey comment from an aviation command and control officer explains it best:  “The 
greatest benefits UAS’s [sic] can provide are to increase situational awareness ‘eyes on’ 
and enhance communication.” 
The tertiary mission survey results were even more diverse than the 
secondary mission results.  Figure 8 shows that there were four major choices for the 
third mission of MEU.  However, in this question the spread between the top three 
choices was larger than in the secondary mission question.  Strike received the most 
responses at 23%, while communication relay, electronic warfare, and FAC(A) were the 
next high recipients, respectively. 
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Figure 8.   Tertiary Mission (with MEU Experience) 
The quaternary mission survey question represented by Figure 9 also 
received a diverse spread of responses.  There were two missions that together received 
half of the responses: electronic warfare and communication relay.  Two other missions 
received a large proportion of the remaining 50%.  They were strike and FAC(A), which 
combined for 32% of the responses. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Quaternary Mission (with MEU Experience) 
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The final survey question polled for the least desired UAS mission.  In 
Figure 10, I display the results of the question; casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) received 
the majority of the responses.  The next two highest recipients were cargo and CSAR, 
respectively.  
 
Figure 10.   Least Desired Mission (with MEU Experience) 
2. Interview Results 
Concurrent to the survey execution, I was able to interview five MEU 
commanders to discuss their thoughts on future UAS support of MEU operations.  There 
were several common themes throughout the interviews.  Each MEU commander seemed 
to have similar thoughts on some basic capabilities of a new system, as well as thoughts 
on ownership and sea basing.  A final common theme was the idea that UAS should be an 
enabler to operations.  
a. Basic Capabilities 
During my interviews with the MEU commanders, there were a few 
general capabilities that they felt were requirements on any future UAS. 
The first requirement was long endurance.  The most common time 
mentioned was 24 hours.  The commanders say the ability to launch a UAS at the end of 
a ship’s established flight window and have it fly until that window opens again the next 
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day as a very good addition to the capability of the MEU/ARG team.  This would also 
limit the problems that arise when trying to de-conflict manned and unmanned aircraft 
operating in a small airspace. 
A requirement mentioned along with a long endurance was the ability to 
launch the UAS over the horizon or beyond line of sight (BLOS).  The commanders all 
agreed that for any UAS to be relevant it needs to be able to operate at the ranges the 
MEU will operate.  Generally speaking, any operation the MEU executes will require 
UAS to fly BLOS and be controlled BLOS. 
b. Ownership 
Of the five commanders I talked to, all unanimously agreed that the MEU 
should own outright the UAS.  Colonel Mark Desens, commander of the 26th MEU, 
explained this position:   
It [MEU] does not have that capability [UAS] right now organic to it.  
Some people say, “Do you have to have everything organic to the 
ARG/MEU team?”  My argument will be, “Yes,” if you think that the 
ARG/MEU is the nation’s crisis response, first on the scene to take action, 
then the answer is yes you need to have those tools. 
c. Sea Base versus Land Base 
All of the commanders agreed on the topic of ownership; however, when 
asked where a UAS asset would be based or located, there was disparity.  The 
commanders differences of opinion centered around the ability to have a responsive 
system if it were land based.  
The arguments raised in favor of a land-based system were 1) MEUs have 
C130 Hercules, communication detachments, and on some occasions F18 Hornets that 
support them from land bases near to the operating areas of the MEU; 2) the ability to 
have a large fixed-wing UAS that can carry increased loads and have increased 
endurance.   
On the other side of the argument, the points raised were (1) on any major 
operation (such as the most recent Libya incursion or any day at Djibouti), space to 
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operate is very limited; (2) throughout the world, there are almost no countries that allow 
over-flight of unmanned aircraft, which severely limits the responsiveness of any land-
based UAS. 
d. Enabler 
The impression that all of the MEU commanders gave me was that they 
believe the UAS is a key enabler.  Generally speaking, UASs have become a high-
demand asset; however, they have not yet become a requirement for operations. 
B. COST ESTIMATES FOR FUTURE UAS    
1. Modeling Choices 
I used Excel and Crystal Ball to model my WBS using the CERs developed in 
Chapter III.  These programs performed the Monte Carlo method, randomly running 
through 10,000 trials using established assumptions.  For our model, I assigned the 
assumptions around a preexisting UAS that best fit the mission capabilities that I derived 
from the survey.     
For this thesis, I used the AH-6X Unmanned Little Bird as the basis of my 
assumptions.  The AH-6X has a BriteStar FLIR, which can provide ISR and has stations 
or “planks” that can fit varying weapons systems or payloads that support the other four 
top missions (strike, FAC[A], electronic warfare, or communications relay;) (Schreiner, 
2008)  Per Table 6, I programmed Crystal Ball with each variable’s probability functions 
closely matching the specifications of the AH-6X. 
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Variable PDF Value Range 
Empty Wt Normal (1100,200) 4–4,589 lbs 
MGTOW Normal (3300, 150) 6–25,600 lbs 
prod Custom (0/.5, 1/.5) 0 or 1 
Endurance Triangle (8,10,12) 1–38 hrs 
Payload Wt Normal(1000,150) 1–1960 lbs 
FF Year Uniform(1973–2000) 1973–2000 
VTOL Custom (0/.1, 1/.9) 0 or 1 
Sensor Wt Normal (440,50) 40–625 lbs 
Tracking Custom (0/.5, 1/.5) 0 or 1 
Avg Res Triangle(.008,.08,.212) .008–.212 nanometers 
Altitude Triangle(15000,18000,20000) 15–65,000 ft 
FU Year Uniform(1991,2002) 1991–2002 
Range Triangle (150,350,800) 0–2,400 naut. miles 
Mobile 
Base/Tactical Custom (0/.5, 1/.5) 0 or 1 
Man Packable Custom (0/.5, 1/.5) 0 or 1 
Sys Qty Uniform(1,8) 1–8 
Table 6.   Crystal Ball Variable Functions (After Boeing AH-6, n.d.) 
2. Model Analysis 
After running the model, we predicted that there would be a normal distribution of 
the costs that would correspond to the AH-6X UAS system.  Figure 11 was the 
distribution that we initially derived.  Examining Figure 11 shows that there are two 
distinct nodes indicating that the cost model is clearly not normal.  
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Figure 11.   UAS Total Average Unit Cost 
After examining the WBS levels and the forecasts associated with each level, we 
found that the Air Vehicle distribution had two very distinct nodes that were driving the 
total cost to not be normal (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12.   Average Air Vehicle Cost 
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When I examined the variable sensitivities found in Appendix D for the air 
vehicle T1 cost estimate, I determined three variables that most likely drove the variable 
costs.  After running several iterations of the Crystal Ball while changing these three 
most sensitive variables, we determined that the binary cost variable “Prod” caused the 
largest distinct nodes in the cost estimates found in Figure 12.  The smaller, more narrow 
node that centered at a lower cost was produced when Prod = 1 (i.e., the air vehicle was a 
production model of an aircraft).  The more dispersed node centered at a higher cost was 
created when Prod = 0 (i.e., the air vehicle was a developmental aircraft). 
C. SUMMARY 
From my analysis of the surveys and the MEU commander interviews, I was able 
to develop a generic list of missions for a future UAS program.  The cost for a UAS 
program that supports these missions would be in the range of 8.5 to 12.7 million dollars 
per UAS depending on the type of air vehicle chosen for the program.  In Chapter V, I 
will further break out the costs and make recommendations for the future of UAS in 
support of MEU operations. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Whatever we do in acquisition, what we’ve got to do first is figure out 
what our strategy is . . . to figure out what we want the Armed Forces of 
the United States to be able to do . . . and then you build to that. You build 
toward an expeditionary Navy and Marine Corps.  You build primarily 
toward very flexible and very adaptable platforms.  You can’t have the 
luxury anymore of single use platforms. 
—Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus (2011) 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Future UAS Capabilities 
Colonel Michael Hudson, commander of the 11th MEU, made the comparison 
between the UAS and the airplane pre–World War II.  In the early days of naval aviation, 
many felt that the airplane was a useful tool, an enabler, but that it would never replace 
the battleship.  
The UAS has the same status: a useful tool, an enabler.  The U.S. has the 
technology and the knowledge to fire a Tomahawk missile hundreds of miles at low 
altitude or land a MV-22 “hands-off” in a desert.  It is that same technology and 
knowledge that will permit unmanned systems to develop beyond an enabler into a 
requirement of modern warfare. 
When a battleship was sunk using an airplane, the Navy demonstrated how the 
airplane could be more than just an enabler to operations.  It was now a requirement for 
operations.  The UAS made that transition when it effectively demonstrated its offensive 
capabilities in Afghanistan by firing missiles at high-value targets.  Unfortunately, the 
USMC has yet to make the move to evolve its UAS program.  It is important that the 
USMC engages in the full capabilities of the UAS. 
The surveys were clear as to what the top five mission sets should be for any 
future UAS program: (1) ISR, (2) strike, (3) FAC(A), (4) communication relay, and (5) 
electronic warfare.  In addition to these mission sets, the future system must have an 
endurance extending to 24 hours and will need BLOS control. 
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2. Cost Estimates for Future UAS 
After determining the major cost driver in the total unit cost, we ran the model 
twice more.  For the first iteration we set Prod = 1 while continuing to make use of 
original probability functions for the other variables.  This iteration enabled us to 
determine the total costs associated with a production aircraft.  The model produced the 
costs in FY03 dollars (with an 80% confidence) for a production aircraft: 
 Air vehicle T1 cost = $2.6 million 
 Total system per-unit cost = $8.45 million 
For the final sampling of the model, we set Prod = 0 to determine the cost of a 
developmental aircraft.  We continued to use the same probability functions for the other 
variables, and the model produced costs in FY03 dollars (with an 80% confidence) for a 
developmental or demonstrator aircraft: 
 Air vehicle T1 cost = $7.2 million 
 Total system per unit cost = $12.72 million 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current DoD acquisition policy is defined as evolutionary.  The costing 
numbers are reflective of why the services should attempt to make use of production or 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment.   
With the anticipated shrinking DoD budgets, development of COTS equipment 
will be key to maintaining future capabilities with fewer dollars. 
With respect to any future UAS programs, there are numerous examples of COTS 
aircraft that have demonstrated an unmanned capability.  Two common examples are the 
Schweizer 333, which is being developed as the MQ-8 Firescout, and the OH-6, which is 
being developed into the AH-6X.  The latter is an excellent example of a platform that 
could support the multimission UAS.  It can execute ISR and designate and shoot targets, 
all with a respecTable 10-hour endurance.  The AH-6X is also designed with a “plank” 
system that can support the addition of communication relay equipment or signals 
intelligence equipment.  The AH-6X can support all of the top five missions 
recommended by the survey participants.   
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The AH-6X is not the final solution to the future needs of the USMC; however, it 
can be purchased today and in the fleet tomorrow.  The USMC has an opportunity in the 
AH-6X to explore the full potential of a UAS in support of an MEU.  This platform will 
enable the USMC to develop techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs); define the 
standard operating procedure (SOP) for UASs; and further define the USMC’s UAS 
needs in an operational environment. 
I recommend that while we develop SOPs and TTPs with a production aircraft 
like the AH-6X, the USMC should look into developing a dedicated UAS to support the 
MEU.  Currently, there is no fixed-wing or VTOL UAS designed specifically for ship use 
that can support the demanding needs of an MEU.  Production aircraft will not meet the 
full requirements of the MEU as they stand.  
This evolutionary approach to UAS will enable the USMC to refine its UAS 
requirement with a production system like the AH-6X while designing for the future.  
Regardless of the system developed, the USMC must invest in the next generation of 
unmanned systems to stay relevant and on the edge of modern warfare. 
C. FOLLOW-ON WORK 
The following list is some items of concern that could use additional attention to 
support the USMC plan to develop a new UAS program of record: 
1. The ability of Navy amphibious ships to support the operation of a future 
UAS program.   
2. Networking of UAS with other aircraft and ships to create a data network. 
3. UAS TTPs in environments other than deserts. 
4. Deck cycles with a long-endurance UAS. 
5. Effect of disaggregated operations on UAS support of MEU operations. 
6. Synergistic mix of Tier II, III, IV, and V UAS in support of MEU/MEB 
MAGTF 
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY QUESTIONS 
This is the list of NPS Internal Review Board approved questions that were posted 
to SurveyMonkey.  Question number 1 was the required consent question and per the 
board’s protocol no one was allow to proceed with the survey without checking yes to the 
consent question. 
1:  Required Consent Question.   
 
2.   What is your primary MOS? 
 
3.   What is your MEU experience: 
Deployed with: 
1 MEU  
2 MEU  
3 MEU  
>3MEU  
Never part of MEU 
 
4.   What is your experience working with unmanned aircraft? 
I am an operator 
I regularly use UAS as part of my mission 
I regularly benefit from support provided by UAS 
I have never worked with a UAS 
 
5.  As UAS continue to develop, what do you think should be the primary mission of an 
unmanned aircraft to best support MEU operations? (If a UAS could do nothing else you 








FAC(A)(includes target designation) 
Other (please list in comments) 
 
6.  If the USMC could develop a multimission UAS, what do you think would be the next 









FAC(A)(includes target designation) 
Other (please list in comments) 
 
7.  Again, if the USMC could develop a multimission UAS, what do you think the 









FAC(A)(includes target designation) 
Other (please list in comments) 
 
7.  Again, if the USMC could develop a multimission UAS, what do you think a fourth 








FAC(A)(includes target designation) 
Other (please list in comments) 
 
8.  If this future USMC UAS can perform multiple missions, what do you think the least 








FAC(A)(includes target designation) 
Other (please list in comments) 
 
9.  Additional comments/suggestions: 
 41
APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
These are the questions used to drive the interviews with the MEU commanders 
 
1. What are your thoughts on current UAS capabilities? 
2. Do you see a place on a MEU for unmanned systems? 
3. Has there been a exercise/operation where you think a UAS or a UAS 
capability could have made a difference in execution?   
4. What would a UAS need to be able to bring to the fight that would warrant 
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APPENDIX C. SURVEY QUESTION RESPONSES FOR ALL 
RESPONDENTS 
This appendix is the graphical representation of the responses of all of the survey 
participants.   
 
  
Figure 13.   Primary Mission (All Respondents) 
 
 




Figure 15.   Tertiary Mission (All Respondents) 
  
Figure 16.   Quaternary Mission (All Respondents) 
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APPENDIX D. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
A sensitivity analysis was completed to determine which variables in each 
equation set had the most impact on the cost estimate.  This appendix has the graphical 
representation of the analysis output. 
 
 
Figure 18.   Air Vehicle T1 Sensitivity 
 














Figure 19.   Sensor Sensitivity 
 
 
Figure 20.   GS&E Sensitivity 
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